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SOME MODEST PROPOSALS FOR CHALLENGING ESTABLISHED
DRESS CODE JURISPRUDENCE*
JENNIFER L. LEVI**
Historically, most courts have sustained employer-imposed, gender-based
dress codes. Two well-established exceptions to the rule exist for dress codes
1
that either (1) objectify or sexualize women or (2) allow for flexibility of
2
standards for male employees’ appearance but require stricter rules for women.
A third, still-evolving exception has recently developed regarding challenges to
3
dress codes by transgender litigants. Despite this recent progress, however, the
classical gender-based dress code—requiring women to conform to feminine
stereotypes and men to conform to masculine stereotypes—has, up to the
4
present, been sustained by a majority of the courts time and again. It is,

* This essay is based on remarks presented at the 2006 Lavender Law Conference, Sept. 8,
2006, 2:00pm EST, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C.
** Jennifer L. Levi is an Associate Professor at Western New England College School of Law. I
am grateful to Jay Sexton for invaluable research and editorial assistance.
1. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ruling that
employee could not be required to wear a “sexually revealing . . . uniform”); Marentette v. Mich.
Host Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (suggesting that sexually provocative dress code
requirement would be impermissible).
2. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D.
Ohio 1987) (finding a dress code requiring female sales clerks to wear a “smock” while allowing
male sales clerks to wear shirts and ties impermissible, even absent a discriminatory motive, because
it perpetuated sexual stereotypes); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028,
1029–30 (7th Cir. 1979) (striking down a dress code that required women to wear a uniform but
allowed men to wear business suits).
3. See, e.g., Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (male-to-female transsexual
student, who was in process of becoming female at time of professor’s alleged sexual harassment,
was subjected to discrimination based on gender, and, thus, was protected by Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1688 (2000); 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 213 (West Supp. 2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000c-6, 2000c-9, 2000h-2
(2000)); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (evidence that a state prison guard’s
actions were motivated by a transsexual inmate’s gender, i.e., by her assumption of a feminine rather
than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor, could support a finding of a gender-motivated
attack under the Gender Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), invalidated by United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st
Cir. 2000) (allegations that a transsexual bank loan applicant was discriminated against based upon
applicant’s gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2000)); Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566,
573 (6th Cir. 2004) (allegations that a transsexual firefighter was discriminated against based upon
employee’s gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-4 (2000)).
4. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing
challenge to policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding employer’s policy that required male
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therefore, fortitious that two cases now offer insights as to why dress codes
generally survive challenges, while also portending strategies for reversing this
longstanding trend.
5
In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
6
sustained against a Title VII challenge a “grooming and appearance” code
7
adopted by Harrah’s Casino that was entitled the “Personal Best” program.
Under the Personal Best program, bartenders (of which Darlene Jespersen was
one) had to be “well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body-toned,
and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified
8
uniform.” Females, but not males, were required to have their hair “teased,
curled, or styled,” and to wear stockings (of nude or natural color), nail polish,
9
10
and make-up that included lip color. Despite the “Personal Best” policy,
Darlene Jespersen never wore make-up at work or outside of her job, due to her
11
personal discomfort with it. Indeed, she was so uncomfortable wearing makeup that she left her employment with Harrah’s—after having been there for over
12
twenty years—because of the new workplace policy. Despite crediting
Jespersen’s sincere discomfort with the policy, the court sustained the program,
finding that, although the program imposed different requirements on men and

employees to have short hair but did not require the same for female employees); Lanigan v. Bartlett
& Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (D. Mont. 1979) (finding sex discrimination claim insufficient
where employer prohibited female, but not male, employees from wearing pantsuits in executive
office); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring male, but not
female, employees to wear ties was not sex discrimination under Title VII); Austin v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding grooming policy requiring male employees
to maintain hair length above the collar acceptable under Title VII); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d
1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissing Title VII claim alleging that grooming policy imposed unduly
harsh requirements on women); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(upholding “policy that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by members of one sex”
under Title VII challenge); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding
policy which only prohibited men from wearing long hair); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249,
1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding grooming policy which “reflect[ed] customary modes of grooming”
acceptable even though differences in policy existed for men and women); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co.,
549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding policy which limited manner in which hair of men could
be cut and which limited manner in which women’s hair could be styled); Earwood v. Cont’l Se.
Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding sex differentiated grooming standards
consistent with Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976)
(upholding policy which required short hair for men, but not women).
5. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-4 (2000).
7. See generally Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104.
8. Id. at 1107.
9. Id.
10. Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (2-1 panel decision) (stating that wearing
makeup “made her feel sick, degraded, exposed, and violated”), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006)
11. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107–08 (en banc).
12. Id.
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women, it did not unequally burden them and therefore was permissible. The
court’s analysis focused not on whether Jespersen had proved that she suffered
discrimination because of her sex, but rather, it considered whether women, as a
14
group, suffered from the policy.
The case of Schroer v. Library of Congress presented decidedly different facts
to the United States District Court of the District of Columbia. Despite the
understandably conspicuous absence of a dress-code challenge, that court
nevertheless reached the same affirmation of an employer’s ability to enforce a
15
gender-based dress code. In that case, a transsexual woman with extraordinary
national defense and security qualifications had an offer to work as an analyst at
16
the Library of Congress withdrawn when her new employer learned that she
17
was transsexual. The plaintiff pled both sex stereotyping (i.e., alleging that if
the applicant had conformed to a female stereotype, including having been born
18
female, she would not have had the position taken away) and straightforward
sex discrimination (i.e., had she been born biologically female, rather than
19
biologically male, she would not have had the position taken away).
Interestingly, rather than deciding the case under the familiar rubric of
impermissible sex stereotyping that is now common for transgender litigants
20
under Title VII, the court instead found a straightforward sex-discrimination

13. Id. at 1110 (“Under established equal burdens analysis, when an employer’s grooming and
appearance policy does not unreasonably burden one gender more than the other, that policy will
not violate Title VII.”).
14. Id. at 1111 (“Having failed to create a record establishing that the ‘Personal Best’ policies are
more burdensome for women than for men, Jespersen did not present any triable issue of fact.”
(emphasis added)).
15. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006).
16. See id. at 205–06.
17. Id. at 206–07.
18. Compl. at ¶¶ 52–53, 55, Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006), available at
2005 WL 1924438.
19. Compl. at ¶¶ 52–53, 55; see also Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
20. Most recent courts to address the question have held transsexual people covered under
existing laws. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) (allegations that
a transsexual police officer was discriminated against based upon employee’s gender nonconforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-4 (2000)); Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (allegations that a
transsexual firefighter was discriminated against based upon employee’s gender non-conforming
behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187,
1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (Gender Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), invalidated by United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), applies with equal force to both men and women, and its
protection extends to transsexuals); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir.
2000) (allegations that a transsexual bank loan applicant was discriminated against based upon
applicant’s gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2000)); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No.
Civ. A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006) (allegations that a transsexual sales
represetative was discriminated against based upon employee’s gender non-conforming behavior
and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-4 (2000)). But see
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1836 (D. Utah 2005) (finding Congress
did not intend transsexual persons to be covered under Title VII); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 89
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1832 (E.D. La. 2002) (same).
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21

violation. The apparent reason for this departure from contemporary
jurisprudence was the District Court’s stated concern that resolving the claim
under a sex-stereotyping theory would undermine the established jurisprudence
of dismissing classical dress-code challenges—just as the Jespersen Court had
22
done.
Thus, while there has been real progress, at least at the margins, in cases
involving transgender litigants challenging dress codes based on sex
stereotypes, much less progress has been made challenging the central and wellestablished case law sustaining gender-based dress codes. Moreover, if Schroer is
any indication, courts seem to be increasingly concerned about how to protect
transgender persons in employment—which is good. However, such progress, if
it serves to foster or exacerbate bad law for non-transgender men and women
who are also hindered in employment opportunities, will have come at a high
price indeed.
It is against this judicial landscape that one is compelled to ask, why are the
courts so seemingly entrenched in their rejection of dress-code challenges? There
exist two potentially contradictory reasons for this established dress-code
jurisprudence: Either the courts are over-empathizing with litigants like Darlene
Jespersen—who are required by employers to conform to rigid stereotypes—or
the courts cannot empathize with them at all. With respect to the overempathizing side, judges may be saying to themselves, “I have to conform to
gender-based stereotypes every day. I don’t particularly like to put on make-up,
stockings, wear a suit, tie, etc. It’s really hard for me to conform to these gender
stereotypes daily, and I’m doing what I need to do to fit into the narrow
constructions of what makes a man or a woman. Therefore, everybody else
should be able to do it, too.”
On the other hand, just the opposite could be going on in the minds of
some judges deciding dress code cases. Some judges may be saying, “Geez,
what’s so wrong with Darlene Jespersen? Either I (for female judges) put on
makeup every day, or my wife (for male judges) puts on makeup every day. It
doesn’t seem to be that problematic. Yeah, she says it’s so stressful—but alleging
that it’s devastating to her self-esteem? That’s really hard to imagine.”
These conjectures regarding the personalization of judges conforming to a
dress code are not so far-fetched, as the Jespersen dissent demonstrates. In his
dissent, Judge Kozinski engaged in a related thought experiment, resulting in
23
his empathizing with Jespersen. As Kozinski explained,
Whether to wear cosmetics—literally, the face one presents to the world—is an
intensely personal choice. . . . If you are used to wearing makeup—as most
American women are—this may seem like no big deal. But those of us not used
to wearing makeup would find a requirement that we do so highly intrusive.

21. See Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212–13.
22. Id. (“Dealing with transsexuality straightforwardly, and applying Title VII to it (if at all) as
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex,’ preserves the outcomes of the post-Price Waterhouse[ v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion),] case law without colliding with the sexual orientation and
grooming code lines of cases.”).
23. See Jespersen, 444 F3d. at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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Imagine, for example, a rule that all judges wear face powder, blush, mascara
and lipstick while on the bench. Like Jespersen, I would find such a regime
24
burdensome and demeaning; it would interfere with my job performance.

In his powerful memoir describing his experience as a gender non25
conforming youth who was put in a mental hospital for his “transgression,”
Dylan Scholinski instructed gender-conforming individuals to imagine, for one
day, taking on a gender expression that is completely uncomfortable. The object
was not to do it as a lark or for drag, but instead in seriousness and earnest. He
then instructed readers to imagine doing it for a week, three weeks, and longer,
and to feel how having to conform to a different gender expectation tears apart
26
your soul.
Quite remarkably, Kozinski was able to engage in Scholinski’s experiment
27
and described what that experience might be like for him. It is difficult to
imagine that something other than this thought experiment persuaded Kozinski
28
(a rather conservative judge ) to support Jespersen’s claim and provide an
analysis contrary to the majority view of well-established dress-code jurisprudence.
Individual judges’ experiences of gender seem certainly to guide their
thinking (and ultimately judging) in the arena of dress-code challenges. I was
first made conscious of that reality when litigating a case on behalf of a
29
transgender loan applicant. In the case of Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., I
represented a transgender woman who applied for a loan at a bank and was
sent home to dress in a more gender-conforming manner before the loan officer
30
would help her. Lucas Rosa, an individual with a female-gender identity who
was born biologically male, was told by the bank that she did not look
31
sufficiently masculine to apply for a bank loan. The case went up to the First
Circuit on a sex-discrimination claim, and was argued under both straightforward and sex-stereotyping discrimination umbrellas. At the panel hearing, I
was asked the following question: “What evidence will you utilize to
32
demonstrate the sex-stereotyping claim?”
The question initially confused me, as I understood sex-stereotyping to be
the unwelcome enforcement of gender norms. In other words, sex-stereotyping
can be demonstrated by a person evidencing that he or she faced an adverse
action for failure to conform to the stereotypical gender norms associated with

24. Id.
25. See DAPHNE SCHOLINSKY, THE LAST TIME I WORE A DRESS (1997). Since writing this book,
Scholinski transitioned from female to male and now goes by the name Dylan.
26. Id.
27. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
28. Professor Jeffrey Rosen has described Judge Kozinski as “conservative libertarian.” IDEAS
& TRENDS: Perhaps Not All Affirmative Action Is Created Equal, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, §4, at 14.
29. 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
30. Id. at 214.
31. Id.
32. This articulation of the question is from my recollection of the argument and is not based on
the transcript.
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their sex. In my view, being sent home for failing to look sufficiently masculine,
if proved, would be enough. After all, had the person been of a different sex, the
decision-maker would not have found him or her to be gender-nonconforming.
Yet, this answer was clearly unsatisfying to the panel. After perhaps too long a
time, I realized the court’s confusion was that it could not find a group harm
associated with forcing an individual to conform to a gender stereotype, since
both men and women were expected to so conform. Therefore, the panel
questioned whether enforced stereotypes alone could prove the sex discrimination claim asserted. At its essence, the question might have been understood
as, “What is the sex-specific harm of sex stereotypes?” More specifically, just
because a litigant can demonstrate that he or she was treated differently because
of his or her sex does not alone prove sex discrimination; discrimination requires
something more than different treatment—it requires something amounting to a
33
group harm.
34
In other words, the court was refocusing on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
the foundational case establishing sex stereotyping as problematic under Title
35
VII, and narrowing its lens upon what a successful sex-stereotyping claim
requires. At least that panel of the First Circuit questioned (without resolving)
whether demonstrating the enforcement of male and female stereotypes met the
36
standard for proving a statutory sex-discrimination claim. Given the ubiquity
of certain stereotypes that lack a communal offense, I think the question is
worthy of more focus as litigators continue to develop stereotyping claims.
Further delineating appropriate limiting principles and explicating the various
harms of sex-stereotyping have become (in light of established law) essential to
the development of the doctrine.
It bears mention that part of the problem identified by the Price Waterhouse
Court was that the plaintiff had been placed in a Catch-22 situation, meaning
that women were kept from advancement at the accounting firm irrespective of
whether they acted more like a female or adopted more masculine
37
characteristics. Indeed, the power of Ann Hopkins’ claim was that, despite her
having adopted traits that would have solidified a man’s advancement at the
firm, she was denied partnership when it was also patently obvious that
advancement would have been denied if she had rigidly conformed to a female
stereotype. As a result, because sex-stereotypes were enforced, women were
denied opportunities. Not to under-emphasize the importance of Price
Waterhouse, the case has been cited for more than the Catch-22 faced by Ann
Hopkins described above. To be sure, its dicta has resulted in the recentlyreversed trend of excluding transgender people from coverage under sex-

33. As Barbara J. Flagg has explained, “Title VII prohibits ‘discrimination,’ but the statute leaves
obscure the precise meaning of that term.” Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White
Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2030 (1995).
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-4 (2000), cited in Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
36. See Rosa, 214 F.3d at 216.
37. 490 U.S. at 251.
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discrimination law. Yet, taken together, the question posed to me in Rosa, the
Jespersen case itself (including its outcome and reflection of the majority
40
41
position), and the Schroer dicta, suggest serious limits to the logical
conclusions drawn from a broad understanding of Price Waterhouse’s sex42
stereotyping language.
What emerges from this analysis is that contemporary courts have taken a
step back from the language of Price Waterhouse when applying a sexstereotyping theory in dress-code challenges. These courts have, seemingly,
crafted an additional requirement to Title VII, beyond the demonstration of
43
disparate treatment. This new requirement obligates plaintiffs not just to
demonstrate sex stereotyping, but also to establish a resultant group-based

38. See Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial
and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 55 (2000). See also, e.g.,
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) (allegations that a transsexual police
officer was discriminated against based upon employee’s gender non-conforming behavior and
appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII); Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566, 573
(6th Cir. 2004) (allegations that a transsexual firefighter was discriminated against based upon
employee’s gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (Gender Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 (2000), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), applies with equal force
to both men and women, and its protection extends to transsexuals); Rosa, 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st
Cir. 2000) (allegations that a transsexual bank loan applicant was discriminated against based upon
applicant’s gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2000)); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No.
Civ. A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006) (allegations that a transsexual sales
represetative was discriminated against based upon employee’s gender non-conforming behavior
and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII); Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
No. 02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (allegations of employment
termination for failure to conform to gender stereotypes in the use of restrooms was actionable
pursuant to Title VII); Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL
22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (alleged discrimination against a transsexual employee for failing
to ‘act like a man’ is actionable pursuant to Title VII); Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01CV-1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001) (allegations that a transsexual employee
was discriminated against based upon employee’s gender non-conforming behavior and appearance
were actionable pursuant to Title VII).
39. 214 F.3d at 213.
40. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir 2006) (en banc).
41. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006).
42. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e are beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water and
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978)) (alteration added)).
43. See, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
We cannot agree, however, that her objection to the makeup requirement, without more,
can give rise to a claim of sex stereotyping under Title VII. If we were to do so, we would
come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or appearance requirement
that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her own self-image,
can create a triable issue of sex discrimination.
Id.
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harm. Indeed, the Schroer court also embraced a narrower reading of Price
Waterhouse, suggesting that disparate treatment requires not simply showing the
different treatment of two separate classes of people, but also requires that one
class be unequally burdened.
[T]he actual holding of Price Waterhouse is considerably more narrow than its
sweeping language suggests . . . the Court meant no more than that: disparate
treatment of men and women by sex stereotype violates Title VII. Adverse action
taken on the basis of an employer’s gender stereotype that does not impose
unequal burdens on men and women or disadvantage one or the other does not
45
state a claim under Title VII.

In other words, to show impermissible sex stereotyping, one must prove both (1)
disparate treatment according to sex-stereotypes and (2) that women as a class
have been adversely harmed as a result. Thus, the problem under this arguably
distorted interpretation of Title VII in Price Waterhouse was not that Ann
Hopkins failed to conform to a feminine stereotype, but that requiring her (and
other women) to do so limited the advancement of all women at the firm. Such
an inference is supported by the Court’s unexpressed acknowledgement that
women demonstrating feminine behavior would undoubtedly have received no
46
better treatment in review for partnership than did Ann Hopkins.
The problem with the additional unequal-burden requirement is, of course,
47
48
that neither the history nor the text of Title VII support it. The whole point of
sex-discrimination protection is that it provides for individuals to be freed from
sex discrimination, regardless of what happens to other applicants or other
women. Therefore, the question formulated in the context of dress codes and
enforcement of stereotypes, is the following: Why have courts created additional
hurdles for litigants? One theory is that the hurdles have been created by the
courts’ confusion between direct-evidence and indirect-evidence claims. It may
be that courts have forgotten the basic structure of discrimination claims
because most contemporary actions involve indirect evidence—possibly also
suggesting the effectiveness of Title VII. In a direct-evidence claim, of course,
there is a smoking gun: an employer essentially states, “We fire you (or do not
hire you), because you are a woman.” These are usually straightforward cases
because direct evidence quickly proves the case in the plaintiff’s favor.
However, such cases are fewer and farther between today. Most sexdiscrimination claims are litigated under an indirect-evidence process. For

44. Id.
45. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
46. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but
whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of
a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not”).
47. The history of the inclusion of the sex discrimination prohibition in Title VII presents little
interpretive help here given that most agree that the term was included principally as an effort to
defeat the law’s adoption. See CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115–17 (1985). Regardless, it offers no support for some
group harm requirement.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
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indirect-evidence cases, the McDonnell Douglas test controls, which requires a
litigant to demonstrate:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
50
complainant’s qualifications.

Upon successful pleading, the burden then shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that it had a legitimate and non-discriminatory justification for the
51
different treatment. However, the burden ultimately falls to the employee to
show that the proffered justification is pretextual and that the real reason was
52
the prohibited one.
Before there was McDonnell Douglas, though, there was direct evidence.
Direct evidence is just that—a claim “of conduct or statements by persons
involved in the decision-making process, which indicate a discriminatory
attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer’s
53
decision.” Few direct-evidence cases are brought because most cases involving
an employer admission of sex discrimination settle before trial. This is due both
to the power of the “smoking gun” and to the considerable burden imposed on
the employer in such a case. Indeed, an employer needs to both state a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision and evidence a
putative reason for its disparate treatment that can explain its facially
contradictory actions.
What is key for this discussion, however, is the ease with which a dress
code case fits into a straightforward, direct evidence, sex-discrimination claim.
Consider, for example, a classic dress code case, such as Jespersen. In that case,
Darlene Jespersen lost her job for refusing to conform to a dress code that
required her to style her hair, paint her nails, and wear particular clothing
54
because she was a woman. Under the most straightforward analysis of
discrimination, Harrah’s terminated her employment “because of sex”—had she
been a man, she would not have been fired. Little, if any, logical leaps need be
made to understand the claim or how it fits within Title VII. Despite its logic,

49. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
50. Id at 802.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 804–05 (the plaintiff “must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by
competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for
a racially discriminatory decision”).
53. Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1046 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion)). Where there is direct evidence, the burden is on
the employer to prove that it would not have made the decision absent the illegitimate motive (in
this context, the sex of the employee). Id.
54. 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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however, the claim failed, as it often has. In Jespersen, the claim failed because of
55
the Ninth Circuit’s focus on a required demonstration of a group-based harm.
This distinction between direct and indirect evidence explains the court’s
confusion about when an individual harm, as opposed to a group-based harm,
must be demonstrated. In direct-evidence cases, a plaintiff alleges facts which
alone support a legal determination that she was treated differently (not hired,
fired, etc.) “because of sex.” In indirect-evidence cases, the plaintiff has access to
no such facts and instead alleges that (1) she is in a protected class (e.g., is a
woman); (2) was qualified for the position (promotion, hiring); (3) was
nonetheless fired (not promoted, not hired), and (4) that the employer continued
to treat other applicants with the plaintiff’s qualification favorably (e.g., hired
56
him, didn’t fire him, promoted him). Having established those basic facts, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove that there was a permissible justification
57
for the different treatment.
Even if the employer is able to advance a putative, nondiscriminatory
reason for the disperate treatment, the case is still not over. At least under Title
VII, the employee must then demonstrate that the basis for the different
58
treatment was her sex. In an indirect-evidence case, how employers treat
women as a class becomes very significant to the case because its treatment of
women, generally, may strengthen its alternatively proposed justification for the
different treatment. This is the classic pretext paradigm: (1) employee is fired for
bad reviews; (2) employee alleges that reason is pretextual; and (3) employer
supports its justification by showing that many women (just not this one) got
good reviews. Thus, in an indirect-evidence case, treatment of other women
matters. This is not so for direct-evidence cases, because the central basis for the
claim is proving the veracity of the direct evidence, which alone substantiates
the disparate-treatment claim.
To state the obvious, the standard dress-code case addressed by this essay
is a direct-evidence case. A plaintiff alleges that a policy treats women
differently than men. Naturally, the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of
the policy, but requiring her to prove that the different treatment has a
subordinating effect on women generally is beyond the requirements of a directevidence claim. Indeed, even in the indirect-evidence context, a demonstration
of subordination is not required for the claim, even if it might be relevant or
provable.
Regardless of the courts’ error in dress-code cases, as litigators, we have to
recognize what the courts are doing and begin to talk more about the groupbased harm that is experienced by the enforcement of discriminatory dress
codes. Fortunately, in most contexts that will not be very difficult.
Stereotypically feminine dress codes make women’s work more difficult. As

55. Id. at 1112 (“The record contains nothing to suggest the grooming standards would
objectively inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job. The only evidence in the record to support the
stereotyping claim is Jespersen’s own subjective reaction to the makeup requirement.”).
56. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 804–05.
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Judge Kozinski noted in dissent in the Jespersen case, having to wear make-up
59
may be “burdensome and demeaning.” Moreover, the evolution of women’s
60
fashion reflects its discriminatory history. Once the practical effect and history
are exposed, dress code cases like Jespersen more comfortably move into the
61
category of impermissible dress codes. This includes, to be sure, cases where
dress codes are struck either because the dress code sexually objectifies women
or because it limits women as a class in the workplace due to the allowance of
discretionary standards for men and rules for women.
The above analysis supports several strategic changes in the way the dress
code cases should be litigated. The first of these strategies involves the
importance of identifying and responding to what courts have been doing in
grafting a group-based harm requirement onto Title VII. Even though the
62
analysis in Jespersen is fundamentally flawed and at odds with established Title
VII jurisprudence, litigants should address this new requirement by
demonstrating a group-based harm without conceding it as necessary to prove a
claim. Second, litigators who are focused on eroding this poorly-developed
dress-code jurisprudence should give more thought to which cases would be the
most sympathetic to a decisionmaker. In this respect, litigators should be
cognizant of judges who find gender stereotypes unobjectionable either because
of the ease by which he or she conforms to them or because of his or her
assessment of their importance. More sympathetic cases for those persons
(reflexively supportive of the imposition of gender norms) might be ones where
there is little or no relationship between the enforced stereotype and the
perceived job requirements. For example, that relationship may be what made
Jespersen such a hard case for the Ninth Circuit.
When asked, many of my colleagues found sympathetic Harrahs’ likely
justification for the imposition of a gender-based dress code in light of the goal
of increasing bar (and ultimately gambling) tabs. Especially where a plaintiff has
direct contact with the consumer public, many reasonable people think that
requiring a bartender to “doll it up” is understandable. On the other hand,
requiring a switchboard operator (if there remain any these days) with no public
contact to do so seems more rooted in objectionable bias. In other words, the
easier it is to divorce the employer’s justification from one relating to business
necessity or customer preferences, the less likely a court will be to sustain a
gender-based dress code. Even though business necessity or customer
preference provides no defense to sex-discriminatory decisionmaking, common
sense suggests that choosing cases to litigate that do not present potentially
sympathetic facts for consumer-conscious decisionmakers would more
favorably serve the goal of eroding bad dress code case law.
59. 444 F.3d at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
60. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Amicus Curiae Brief of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
and Equal Rights Advocates in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 171–72 (2001)
(describing a Massachusetts Bay colony law that considered strict adherence to a dress code essential
to the public order and the organization called Dress Reform Club of Boston that held public
demonstrations seeking more practical clothing alternatives for women).
61. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
62. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104.
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Finally, the easier it is to shed distracting justifications allegedly grounded
in economic concerns, the easier it is to expose perhaps the truest goal of gender
stereotypes—providing society with an uncomplicated method of identifying
individuals as either female or male—which is, I argue, more easily
demonstrated to be problematic. In the case of Anderson v. Martin, the United
States considered equal-protection and due-process challenges to Louisiana’s
63
practice of identifying the race of candidates on election ballots. Louisiana
defended its practice as not being race-discriminatory, as it simply, without bias
64
or indication of prejudice, identified each candidate’s race. Despite its equal
application to all candidates, and despite no demonstration of a group-based
65
harm, the Court struck down the practice. As the Court explained, the
placement of the race indicator beside a candidate’s name
. . . imposes no restriction upon anyone’s candidacy nor upon an elector’s choice
in the casting of his ballot. But by placing a racial label on a candidate at the
most crucial state in the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—
66
the State furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused.

Moreover, explained the Court, “by directing the citizen’s attention to the single
consideration of race or color, the State indicates that a candidate’s race or color
67
is an important . . . consideration in the citizen’s choice.” Accordingly, “the vice
lies not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind
68
a racial classification that induces racial prejudice . . . .” Synthesized, the Court
identified two key problems with the race marker: (1) it is a vehicle by which
prejudice is aroused and (2) by its presence, it suggests a relevance of the
69
characteristic.
The analogy to be drawn to the dress-code cases is this: To the extent that
litigants can reveal that the purpose of the enforcement of gender norms is
simply to distinguish between men and women they will have more success in
challenging such dress codes. The reason is because exposing the dress codes as
being for the purpose only of making sex distinctions between people reveals
the harm. As in Anderson, the harm is not (just) in the fact that some dress codes
70
harm women (or some women). Rather, the harm is that all gender-based dress
codes suggest that sex is a relevant distinction in a workplace context. If that is
the case, then private prejudice against women may be justifiable—a result
obviously in tension with the letter and spirit of Title VII. Moreover, because the
visual distinctions between male and female are exacerbated by dress codes, the
dress codes themselves become the vehicle for the exercise of prejudice.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

375 U.S. 399 (1964).
Id. at 403–04.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 399.
See id.
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The precedent sustaining gender-based dress codes is now longstanding
and well-established. Although there are some exceptions, most dress code cases
have allowed employers to enforce gender norms despite seemingly clear
federal law that by its language should not permit such distinctions. Recent
cases have eroded the strength of the dress code jurisprudence at least at the
margins in cases affecting gay, lesbian, and transgender litigants. Advocates
would do well to pay close attention to judges’ views of the distinction between
the main and marginal cases. A close analysis of two recent cases, one involving
a transgender litigant and one not, reveals some glimpse into a way out of the
71
narrow rulings issued to date. Focusing on the human element of judges’
personal experiences of gender norms and the reflexive (but inaccurate)
application of employment discrimination doctrine may offer some hope for
changing the law.

71. Compare Schroer v. Library of Cong., 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006), with Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d
en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).

